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Abstract
This paper studies binary hypothesis testing based on measurements from a set of sensors, a subset
of which can be compromised by an attacker. The measurements from a compromised sensor can be
manipulated arbitrarily by the adversary. The asymptotic exponential rate, with which the probability
of error goes to zero, is adopted to indicate the detection performance of a detector. In practice, we
expect the attack on sensors to be sporadic, and therefore the system may operate with all the sensors
being benign for an extended period of time. This motivates us to consider the trade-off between the
detection performance of a detector, i.e., the probability of error, when the attacker is absent (defined as
efficiency) and the worst-case detection performance when the attacker is present (defined as security).
We first provide the fundamental limits of this trade-off, and then propose a detection strategy that
achieves these limits. We then consider a special case, where there is no trade-off between security and
efficiency. In other words, our detection strategy can achieve the maximal efficiency and the maximal
security simultaneously. Two extensions of the secure hypothesis testing problem are also studied and
fundamental limits and achievability results are provided: 1) a subset of sensors, namely “secure” sensors,
are assumed to be equipped with better security countermeasures and hence are guaranteed to be benign;
2) detection performance with unknown number of compromised sensors. Numerical examples are given
to illustrate the main results.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Background and Motivations: Network embedded sensors, which are pervasively used to
monitor the system, are vulnerable to malicious attacks due to their limited capacity and sparsely
spatial deployment. An attacker may get access to the sensors and send arbitrary messages, or
break the communication channels between the sensors and the system operator to tamper with
the transmitted data. Such integrity attacks have motivated many researches on how to infer
useful information from corrupted sensory data in a secure manner [1]–[3]. In this paper, we
follow this direction but with the focus on the trade-off between the performance of the inference
algorithm when the attacker is absent and the “worst-case” performance when the attacker, which
has the knowledge of the inference algorithm, is present. We define two metrics, efficiency and
security, to characterize the performance of the hypothesis testing algorithm (or detector) under
the two scenarios respectively and analyze the trade-off between security and efficiency.
Our Work and its Contributions: We consider the sequential binary hypothesis testing based
on the measurements from m sensors. It is assumed that n out of these m sensors may be
compromised by an attacker, the set of which is chosen by the attacker and fixed over time.
The adversary can manipulate the measurements sent by the compromised sensors arbitrarily.
According to Kerckhoffs’s principle [4], i.e., the security of a system should not rely on its
obscurity, we assume that the adversary knows exactly the hypothesis testing algorithm used by
the fusion center. On the other hand, the fusion center (i.e., the system operator) only knows the
number of malicious sensors n, but does not know the exact set of the compromised sensors.
At each time k, the fusion center needs to make a decision about the underlying hypothesis
based on the possibly corrupted measurements collected from all sensors until time k. Given a
hypothesis testing algorithm at the fusion center (i.e., a measurements fusion rule), the worst-case
probability of error is investigated, and the asymptotic exponential decay rate of the error, which
we denote as the “security” of the system, is adopted to indicate the detection performance. On
the other hand, when the attacker is absent, the detection performance of a hypothesis testing
algorithm, i.e., the asymptotic exponential decay rate of the error probability, is denoted by the
“efficiency”.
We focus on the trade-off between efficiency and security. In particular, we are interested in
characterizing the fundamental limits of the trade-offs between efficiency and security and the
detectors that achieve these limits.
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3The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
1) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that studies the trade-off between the
efficiency and security of any inference algorithm.
2) With mild assumptions on the probability distributions of the measurements, we provide the
fundamental limits of the trade-off between the efficiency and security (Corollaries 1 and 2).
Furthermore, we present detectors, with low computational complexity, that achieve these
limits (Theorem 4). Therefore, the system operator can easily adopt the detectors we
proposed to obtain the best trade-off between efficiency and security. Interestingly, in
some cases, e.g., Gaussian random variables with same variance and different mean, the
maximal efficiency and the maximal security can be achieved simultaneously (Theorem 5).
3) Similar results, i.e., the fundamental limits of the trade-off and the detectors that possess
these limits, are established with several different problem settings (Section V). This shows
that our analysis techniques are insightful and may be helpful for the future related studies.
Related Literature: A sensor is referred to as a Byzantine sensor if its messages to the fusion
center are fully controlled by an adversary1. Recently, detection with Byzantine sensors has
been studied extensively in [5]–[14], among which [5]–[7] took the perspective of an attacker
and aimed to find the most effective attack strategy, [8]–[11] focused on designs of resilient
detectors, and [12]–[14] formulated the problem in a game-theoretic way. The main results
of [5] are the critical fraction of Byzantine sensors that blinds the fusion center, which is
just the counterpart of the breakdown point in robust statistics [15], and the most effective
attack strategy that minimizes the asymptotic error exponent in the Neyman-Pearson setting, i.e.,
the Kullback–Leibler (K–L) divergence. Since the Byzantine sensors are assumed to generate
independent and identical distributed (i.i.d.) data, the resulting measurements with minimum
K–L divergence and the corresponding robust detector coincide with those in [16]. Similar
results were obtained in [6], [7] by considering non-asymptotic probability of error in Bayesian
setting and asymptotic Bayesian performance metric, i.e., Chernoff information, respectively.
The authors in [8] focused on computation efficient algorithms to determine optimal parameters
of the q-out-of-m procedure [17] in large scale networks for different fractions of Byzantine
sensors. More than two types of sensors were assumed in [9], [10]. The authors thereof proposed
1In practice, to manipulate the data of a sensor, an adversary may attack the sensor node itself or break the communication
channel between the sensor and the fusion center. In this paper, we do not distinguish these two approaches.
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4a maximum likelihood procedure, which is based on the iterative expectation maximization
(EM) algorithm [18], simultaneously classifying the sensor nodes and performing the hypothesis
testing. The authors in [11] showed that the optimal detector is of a threshold structure when
the fraction of Byzantine sensors is less than 0.5. A zero-sum game was formulated in each
of [12]–[14], among which a closed-form equilibrium point of attack strategy and detector was
obtained in [14], computation efficient and nearly optimal equilibrium point (exact equilibrium
point only in certain cases) was obtained in [12], and numerical simulations were used to study
the equilibrium point in [13].
While in [5]–[10], [13] the Byzantine sensors are assumed to generate malicious data inde-
pendently, this work, as in [11], [12], [14], assumes that the Byzantine sensors may collude
with each other. The collusion model is more reasonable since the attacker is malicious and
will arbitrarily change the messages of the sensors it controlls. Notice also that compared to the
independence model, the collusion model complicates the analysis significantly. Unlike [6]–[10],
[12], [13], where the sensors only send binary messages, this work, as in [5], [11], [14], assumes
that the measurements of a benign sensor can take any value. Since the binary message model
simplifies the structure of corrupted measurements, and, hence, implicitly limits the capability of
an attacker, it is easier to be dealt with. This work differs from [11], [14] as follows. The authors
in [11] focused on one time step scenario. The analysis is thus fundamentally different and more
challenging. On the contrary, in this work the hypothesis testing is performed sequentially and
an asymptotic regime performance metric, i.e., the Chernoff information, is concerned. A similar
setting as in this work was considered in our recent work [14]. However, [14] focused on the
equilibrium point. The performance (i.e., the security and efficiency) of the obtained equilibrium
detection rule is merely one point of the admissible set that will be characterized in this paper.
Finally, we should remark that the aforementioned literature mainly focuses on designing
algorithms in adversarial environment. However, those algorithms may perform poorly in the
absence of the adversary comparing to the classic Neyman-Pearson detector or Naive Bayes
detector. A fundamental question, which we seek to answer in this paper, is that how to design
a detection strategy which performs “optimally” regardless of whether the attacker is present.
Organization: In Section II, we formulate the problem of binary hypothesis testing in adver-
sarial environments, in which the attack model, the performance indices and the notion of the
efficiency and security are defined. For the sake of completeness, we give a brief introduction
the large deviation theory in Section III, which is a key supporting technique for the later
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5analysis. The main results are presented in Section IV. We first provide the fundamental limits
of the trade-off between the efficiency and security. We then propose detectors that achieve these
limits. At last, we show that the maximal efficiency and the maximal security can be achieved
simultaneously in some cases. Two extensions are investigated in Section V. After providing
numerical examples in Section VI, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
Notations: R (R+) is the set of (nonnegative) real numbers. Z+ is the set of positive integers.
The cardinality of a finite set I is denoted as |I|. For a set A ∈ Rn, int(A) denotes its interior.
For any sequence {x(k)}∞k=1, we denote its average at time k as x¯(k) ,
∑k
t=1 x(t)/k. For a
vector x ∈ Rn, the support of x, denoted by supp(x), is the set of indices of nonzero elements:
supp(x) , {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : xi 6= 0}.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider the problem of detecting a binary state θ ∈ {0, 1} using m sensors’ measurements.
Define the measurement y(k) at time k to be a row vector:
y(k) ,
[
y1(k) y2(k) · · · ym(k)
]
∈ Rm, (1)
where yi(k) is the scalar measurement from sensor i at time k. For simplicity, we define Y(k)
as a vector of all measurements from time 1 to time k:
Y(k) ,
[
y(1) y(2) · · · y(k)
]
∈ Rmk. (2)
Given θ, we assume that all measurements {yi(k)}i=1,...,m, k=1,2,... are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.). The probability measure generated by yi(k) is denoted as ν when θ = 0 and it
is denoted as µ when θ = 1. In other words, for any Borel-measurable set A ⊆ R, the probability
that yi(k) ∈ A equals ν(A) when θ = 0 and equals µ(A) when θ = 1. We denote the probability
space generated by all measurements y(1), y(2), . . . as (Ωy, Fy, Poθ)
2, where for any l ≥ 1
P
o
θ(yi1(k1) ∈ A1, . . . , yil(kl) ∈ Al)
=


ν(A1)ν(A2) . . . ν(Al) if θ = 0
µ(A1)µ(A2) . . . µ(Al) if θ = 1
,
2The superscript “o” stands for original, which is contrasted with corrupted measurements.
January 22, 2018 DRAFT
6when (ij , kj) 6= (ij′, kj′) for all j 6= j
′. The expectation taken with respect to Poθ is denoted by
E
o
θ. We further assume that ν and µ are absolutely continuous with respect to each other. Hence,
the log-likelihood ratio λ : R→ R of yi(k) is well defined as
λ(yi) , log
(
dµ
dν
(yi)
)
, (3)
where dµ/dν is the Radon-Nikodym derivative.
We define fk : R
mk → [0, 1], the detector at time k, as a mapping from the measurement
space Y(k) to the interval [0, 1]. When fk(Y(k)) = 0, the system makes a decision θˆ = 0, and
when fk(Y(k)) = 1, θˆ = 1. When fk(Y(k)) = γ ∈ (0, 1), the system then “flips a biased coin”
to choose θˆ = 1 with probability γ and θˆ = 0 with probability 1 − γ. The system’s strategy
f , (f1, f2, · · · ) is defined as an infinite sequence of detectors from time 1 to ∞.
A. Attack Model
Let the (manipulated) measurements received by the fusion center at time k be
y′(k) = y(k) + ya(k), (4)
where ya(k) ∈ Rm is the bias vector injected by the attacker at time k. In the following,
Assumptions 1–3 are made on the attacker, among which Assumption 1 is in essence the only
limitation we pose.
Assumption 1 (Spare Attack). There exists an index set I ⊂ M , {1, 2, . . . , m} with |I| = n
such that
⋃∞
k=1 supp(y
a(k)) = I. Furthermore, the system knows the number n, but it does not
know the set I.
We should remark that the above assumption does not pose any restrictions on the value of
yai (k) if sensor i is compromised at time k, i.e., the bias injected into the data of a compromised
sensor can be arbitrary.
Assumption 1 says that the attacker can compromise up to n out ofm sensors at each time. It is
practical to assume that the attacker possesses limited resources, i.e., the number of compromised
sensors is (non-trivially) upper bounded, since otherwise it would be too pessimistic and the
problem becomes trivial. The quantity n might be determined by the a priori knowledge about
the quality of each sensor. Alternatively, the quantity n may be viewed as a design parameter,
which indicates the resilience level that the system is willing to introduce; the details of which are
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7in Remark 1. Notice also that since the worst-case attacks (over the set of compromised sensors
and the attack strategy) are concerned (the performance metric will be introduced shortly), it is
equivalent to replace the cardinality requirement |I| = n by |I| ≤ n. We should note that in [6],
[8], [12], it was also assumed that the number/fraction of malicious sensor nodes is known to
the system operator.
Moreover, the set of compromised sensors is assumed to be fixed over time. Notice that if
we assume that the set of compromised sensors has a fixed cardinality but is time-varying, i.e.,
there exists no a set like I to bound the compromised sensors, the attacker would be required
to abandon the sensor nodes it has compromised, which is not sensible. Notice that in [8]–
[10], it was assumed the set of malicious/misbehaving sensors is fixed as well. We should also
note that though this work is concerned with asymptotic performances (i.e., the security and
efficiency introduced later), the numerical simulations in Section VI show that our algorithm
indeed perform quite well in an non-asymptotic setup. Actually, if a finite-time horizon problem
is considered and the time required for an attacker to control a benign sensor is large enough,
then it is reasonable to assume that the set of compromised sensors is fixed.
In fact, the exactly same sparse attack model as in Assumption 1 has been widely adopted by
literature dealing with Byzantine sensors, e.g., state estimation [19], [20], and quickest change
detection [21].
Finally, we should note that we do not assume any pattern of the bias yai (k) for i ∈ I, i.e., the
malicious bias injected may be correlated across the compromised sensors and correlated over
time. Compared to the independence assumption in [5]–[10], [13], our assumption improves the
effectiveness of the attacker and is more realistic in the sense that the attacker is malicious and
will do whatever it wants.
Remark 1. The parameter n can also be interpreted as how many bad sensors the system
can and is willing to tolerate, which is a design parameter for the system operator. In general,
increasing n will increase the resilience of the detector under attack. However, as is shown in
the rest of the paper, a larger n may result in more conservative design and is likely to cause
a performance degradation during normal operation when no sensor is compromised.
Assumption 2 (Model Knowledge). The attacker knows the probability measure µ and ν and
the true state θ.
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8By the knowledge about the sensor, the attacker can develop the probability measure µ and
ν. To obtain the true state, the attacker may deploy its own sensor network. Though it might
be difficult to satisfy in practice, this assumption is in fact conventional in literature concerning
the worst-case attacks, e.g., [5], [21]. Nevertheless, this assumption is in accordance with the
Kerckhoffs’s principle.
Assumption 3 (Measurement Knowledge). At time k, the attacker knows the current and all the
historical measurements available at the compromised sensors.
Since the attacker knows the true measurement of a compromised sensor i, yi(k), it may set
the fake measurement arrived at the fusion center y′i(k) to any value it wants by injecting y
a
i (k).
One may also verify that all the results in this paper remain even if the attacker is “strong”
enough where at time k, it knows measurements from all the sensors Y(k).
An admissible attack strategy is any causal mapping from the attacker’s available information
to a bias vector that satisfies Assumption 1. This is formalized as follows. Let I = {i1, i2, . . . , in}.
Define the true measurements of the compromised sensors from time 1 to k as
YI(k) ,
[
yI(1) yI(2) · · · yI(k)
]
∈ R|I|k
with
yI(k) ,
[
yi1(k) yi2(k) · · · yin(k)
]
∈ R|I|.
Similar to Y(k), Y′(k) (Ya(k)) is defined as all the manipulated (bias vector) from time 1 to
k. The bias ya(k) is chosen as a function of the attacker’s available information at time k:
ya(k) , g(YI(k),Y
a(k − 1), I, θ, k), (5)
where g is a function3 of YI(k),Y
a(k − 1), I, θ, k such that ya(k) satisfies Assumption 1. We
denote g as an admissible attacker’s strategy. Notice that since time k is an input variable and the
available measurements YI(k),Y
a(k−1) are “increasing” with respect to time k, the definition
in (5) does not exclude the time-varying attack strategy. Denote the probability space generated
by all manipulated measurements y′(1), y′(2), . . . as (Ω, F , Pθ). The expectation taken with
respect to the probability measure Pθ is denoted by Eθ.
3The function g is possibly random. For example, given the available information, the adversary can flip a coin to decide
whether to change the measurement or not.
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9B. Asymptotic Detection Performance
Given the strategy of the system and the attacker, the probability of error at time k can be
defined as
e(θ, I, k) ,


E0fk(Y
′(k)) when θ = 0,
1− E1fk(Y
′(k)) when θ = 1.
(6)
Notice that fk could take any value from [0, 1]. Hence, the expected value of fk is used to
compute the probability of error. In this paper, we are concerned with the worst-case scenario.
As a result, let us define
ǫ(k) , max
θ=0,1,|I|=n
e(θ, I, k). (7)
In other words, ǫ(k) indicates the worst-case probability of error considering all possible sets
of compromised sensors and the state θ given the detection rule f and attack strategy g. Notice
also that in accordance with Assumption 1, the set I in the above equation is fixed over time.
Ideally, for each time k, the system wants to design a detector fk to minimize ǫ(k). However,
such a task can hardly be accomplished analytically since the computation of the probability of
error usually involves numerical integration. Thus, in this article, we consider the asymptotic
detection performance in hope to provide more insight on the detector design. Define the rate
function as
ρ , lim inf
k→∞
−
log ǫ(k)
k
. (8)
Clearly, ρ is a function of both the system strategy f and the attacker’s strategy g. As such,
we will write ρ as ρ(f, g) to indicate such relations. Since ρ indicates the rate with which the
probability of error goes to zero, the system would like to maximize ρ in order to minimize the
detection error. On the contrary, the attacker wants to decrease ρ to increase the detection error.
C. Interested Problems
In practice, the attacker may not be present consistently. As a result, the system will operate
for an extended period of time with all sensors being benign. Thus, a natural question arises: is
there any detection rule that has “decent” performance regardless of the presence of the attacker?
Or is there a fundamental trade-off between security and efficiency? In other words, a detector
that is “good” in the presence of an adversary will be “bad” in a benign environment. This paper
is devoted to answering this question.
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Informally, the performance of a detection rule when there is no attacker at all is referred
to by “efficiency”, while the performance when the worst-case attacker (provided that the
attacker knows the detection rule used by the system) is present is referred to by “security”.
Mathematically speaking, given a system strategy f , denote by E(f) and S(f) its efficiency and
security respectively, which are formalized as follows:
E(f) ,ρ(f, g = 0), (9)
S(f) , inf
g
ρ(f, g) (10)
where 0 ∈ Rm is the zero vector.
III. PRELIMINARY: LARGE DEVIATION THEORY
In this section, we introduce the large deviation theory, which is a key supporting technique
of this paper.
To proceed, we first introduce some definitions. Let Mω(w) ,
∫
Rd
ew·Xdω(X), w ∈ Rd be the
moment generating function for the random vector X ∈ Rd that has the probability measure ω,
where w ·X is the dot product. Let domω , {w ∈ Rd|Mω(w) < ∞} be the support such that
Mω(w) is finite. Define the Fenchel–Legendre transform of the function logMω(w) as
Iω(x) = sup
w∈Rd
{x · w − logMω(w)}, x ∈ R
d. (11)
Theorem 1 (Multidimensional Crame´r’s Theorem [22]). Suppose X(1), . . . , X(k), . . . be a
sequence of i.i.d. random vectors and X(k) ∈ Rd has the probability measure ω. Let X(k) ,∑k
t=1X(t)/k, k ∈ Z+ be the empirical mean. Then if 0 ∈ int(domω), the probability P(X(k) ∈
A) with A ⊆ Rd satisfies the large deviation principle, i.e.,
1) if A is closed,
lim sup
k→∞
1
k
log P(X(k) ∈ A) ≤ − inf
x∈A
Iω(x).
2) if A is open,
lim inf
k→∞
1
k
logP(X(k) ∈ A) ≥ − inf
x∈A
Iω(x).
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IV. MAIN RESULTS
A. Technical Preliminaries
Denote the moment generating function of the log-likelihood ratio λ under each hypothesis
as:
M0(w) ,
∫ ∞
y=−∞
exp(wλ(y))dν(y), (12)
M1(w) ,
∫ ∞
y=−∞
exp(wλ(y))dµ(y). (13)
Furthermore, define dom0 as the region whereM0(w) is finite and I0(x) as the Fenchel–Legendre
transform of logM0(w). The quantities M1(w), dom1 and I1(x) are defined similarly.
Denote the the Kullback-Leibler (K–L) divergences by
D(1‖0) ,
∫ ∞
y=−∞
λ(y)dµ, D(0‖1) , −
∫ ∞
y=−∞
λ(y)dν.
To apply the multidimensional Crame´r’s Theorem and avoid degenerate problems, we adopt the
following assumptions:
Assumption 4. 0 ∈ int(dom0) and 0 ∈ int(dom1).
Assumption 5. The K–L divergences are well-defined, i.e., 0 < D(1‖0), D(0‖1) <∞.
With the above assumptions, we have the following properties of I0(x) and I1(x). the proof
of which is provided in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 4 and 5, the followings hold:
1) I0(x) (I1(x)) is twice differentiable, strictly convex and strictly increasing (strictly decreas-
ing) on [−D(0‖1), D(1‖0)].
2) The following equalities hold:
I1(D(1‖0)) = 0, (14)
I0(D(1‖0)) = D(1‖0), (15)
I0(−D(0‖1)) = 0, (16)
I1(−D(0‖1)) = D(0‖1). (17)
I0(0) = I1(0). (18)
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Fig. 1: Illustration of I0(x) and I1(x). The figure is plotted by assuming y1(1) to be Bernoulli
distributed under both hypotheses with Po0(y1(1) = 1) = 0.02 and P
o
1(y1(1) = 1) = 0.6.
Since I0(0) = I1(0), let us define
C , I0(0). (19)
To make the presentation clear, we illustrate I0(x) and I1(x) in Fig. 1.
The “inverse functions” of I0(x) and I1(x) are defined as follows: for z ≥ 0,
I−10 (z) =max{x ∈ R : I0(x) = z},
I−11 (z) =min{x ∈ R : I1(x) = z}.
LetDmin , min{D(0‖1), D(1‖0)}. We further define h(z) : (0, (m− n)Dmin) 7→ (0, (m− n)Dmin)
as
h(z)
,(m− n)min{I0(I
−1
1 (z/(m− n)), I1(I
−1
0 (z/(m− n))}. (20)
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B. Fundamental Limits
We are ready to provide the fundamental limitations between efficiency and security. The
proof is provided in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. For any detection rule f , the following statements on E(f) and S(f) are true:
1) E(f) ≤ mC,
2) S(f) ≤ (m− 2n)+C, where (m− 2n)+ = max{0, m− 2n}.
3) S(f) ≤ E(f),
4) Let E(f) = z, we have
S(f) ≤
{
h(z) if 0 < z < (m− n)Dmin (21a)
0 if z ≥ (m− n)Dmin. (21b)
Remark 2. Theorem 3 indicates that mC is the maximum efficiency that can be achieved by
any detector, while (m − 2n)+C is the maximum security that can be achieved. Therefore, if
m ≤ 2n, i.e., no less that half of the sensors are compromised, then S(f) = 0 for any f , which
implies that all detectors will have zero security. In that case, the naive Bayes detector will be
the optimal choice since it has the optimal efficiency and the analysis becomes trivial. Therefore,
without any further notice, we assume m > 2n for the rest of the paper.
Notice that fourth constraint in Theorem 3 indicates a trade-off between security and efficiency.
For general cases, the maximum security and efficiency may not be achieved simultaneously.
However, in Section IV-D, we will prove that for a special case, there exist detectors that can
achieve the maximum security and efficiency at the same time.
Notice that I0(x) (I1(x)) is strictly increasing (decreasing) on [−D(0‖1), D(1‖0)]. Therefore,
combining (15) and (17), one obtains that h(z) is strictly decreasing. Then the dual version
of (21a) is obtained as follows. Let S(f) = z we have that if 0 < z ≤ (m− 2n)C,
E(f) ≤ h−1(z) = h(z), (22)
where h−1(z) is the inverse function of h(z), and the equality holds because h(z) is an involutory
function, i.e., h(h(z)) = z for every z ∈ (0, (m− n)Dmin).
We then have the following two corollaries. The results follow straightforwardly from Theo-
rem 3 and (22), we thus omit the proofs.
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Corollary 1. Suppose the security of a detector f satisfies
S(f) = z ∈ [0, (m− 2n)C],
then the maximum efficiency of f satisfies the following inequality:
max
f∈{f :S(f)=z}
E(f) ≤


mC if z = 0
he(z) if z > 0
,
where he(z) , min{mC, h(z)}.
Corollary 2. Suppose the efficiency of a detector f satisfies
E(f) = z ∈ [0, mC],
then the maximum security of f satisfies the following inequality:
max
f∈{f :E(f)=z}
S(f) ≤


hs(z) if 0 < z < z
′,
0 if z ≥ z′ or z = 0,
where hs(z) = min{z, (m− 2n)C, h(z)}, and z′ = (m− n)Dmin.
C. Achievability
In this section, we propose a detector that achieves the upper bounds in Corollaries 1 and 2.
Let zs ≤ (m−2n)C. At time k ≥ 1, the algorithm, denoted by f ∗zs , is implemented as follows.
Remark 3. We here discuss about the computational complexity of the detection rule f ∗zs . The
computational complexity for the step 1 is O(m). Notice that the quantity λ¯i(k) is computed in a
recursive fashion. The complexity for the step 2 is O(m logm). To compute δ(0, k) and δ(1, k),
we can first sort I0(λ¯i(k)) and I1(λ¯i(k)) in ascending order, respectively, and then sum the first
m− 2n elements of each. The computational complexity for the step 3 and step 4 is fixed, and
the step 5 has computational complexity O(m). Therefore, the total computational complexity
for each time step is O(m logm).
We now show the performance of f ∗zs and the proof is provided in Appendix C.
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Algorithm 1 Hypothesis testing algorithm f ∗zs
1: Compute the empirical mean of the likelihood ratio from time 1 to time k for each sensor i:
λ¯i(k) ,
k∑
t=1
λ(y′i(t))/k
=
k − 1
k
λ¯i(k − 1) +
1
k
λ(y′i(k)) (23)
with λ¯i(0) = 0.
2: Compute I0(λ¯i(k)) and I1(λ¯i(k)) for each i. Compute the following sum:
δ(0, k) , min
|O|=m−n,O⊂M
∑
i∈O
I0(λ¯i(k)),
δ(1, k) , min
|O|=m−n,O⊂M
∑
i∈O
I1(λ¯i(k)).
3: If δ(0, k) < zs, make a decision θˆ = 0; go to the next step otherwise.
4: If δ(1, k) < zs, make a decision θˆ = 1; go to the next step otherwise.
5: If
∑m
i=1 λ¯i(k) < 0, make a decision θˆ = 0; make a decision θˆ = 1 otherwise.
Definition 1. (ze, zs) are called an admissible pair if the following inequalities holds:
0 ≤zs ≤ (m− 2n)C,
ze ≤


mC if zs = 0
he(zs) if zs > 0
,
where he(zs) is defined in Corollary 1.
Theorem 4. Let (ze, zs) be any admissible pair of efficiency and security. Then there holds
E(f ∗zs) ≥ ze, S(f
∗
zs
) ≥ zs.
The above theorem means that the upper bounds in Corollaries 1 and 2 are achieved by
f ∗zs . Hence, we provide a tight characterization on admissible efficiency and security pair. We
illustrate the shape of admissible region in Fig 2.
Remark 4. The optimal detector may not be necessarily unique, in the sense that there may exist
other detectors, other than the one defined by Algorithm 1, that can achieve the same efficiency
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Fig. 2: Achievable efficiency and security region for any detector. The figure is plotted by
assuming y1(1) to be Bernoulli distributed under both hypotheses with P
o
0(y1(1) = 1) = 0.02
and Po1(y1(1) = 1) = 0.6. The shaded area is the admissible pair (E(f), S(f)) for any detector
f . The red dashed line is the function (m − n)I0(I
−1
1 (z/(m − n))), while the blue dotted line
the function (m− n)I1(I
−1
0 (z/(m− n))).
and security limits. By definition, the detectors achieving the limits have the same asymptotic
performance. However, the finite-time performance (in terms of detection error) may be different
and we are planning to investigate this in the future work.
D. Special Case: Symmetric Distribution
In this subsection, we discuss a case where the maximum security and efficiency can be
achieved simultaneously by a detector.
Notice that by the definition of admissible pair, if we have
h((m− 2n)C) ≥ mC, (24)
then we know that (ze = mC, zs = (m − 2n)C) is an admissible pair and hence the detector
f ∗(m−2n)C defined in Section IV-C can achieve maximum security (m − 2n)C and efficiency
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mC simultaneously. In other words, adding security will not deteriorate the performance of the
system in the absence of the adversary.
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for (24), which is based on the first
order derivative of I0(·) and I1(·). The proof is presented in Appendix D for the sake of legibility.
Theorem 5. If I
(1)
0 (x)|x=0 = −I
(1)
1 (x)|x=0, then h((m−2n)C) ≥ mC holds. Therefore, f
∗
(m−2n)C
possesses not only the maximal security but also the maximal efficiency.
Notice that whether or not the above sufficient condition is satisfied merely depends on the
probability distribution of the original observations, which is independent of the number of the
compromised sensors.
If there exists “symmetry” between distribution µ and ν, then the sufficient condition can be
satisfied. To be specific, if there exists a constant a such that for any Borel measurable set A,
we have
µ(a+A) = ν(a−A),
then one can prove that
M0(w) = M0(−w),
which further implies that
I0(x) = I1(−x)⇒ I
(1)
0 (x)|x=0 = −I
(1)
1 (x)|x=0.
We provide two examples of pairs of “symmetric” distributions as follows:
1) Each yi(k) is i.i.d. Bernoulli distributed and
yi(k) =


θ with probability p0
1− θ with probability 1− p0
2) Each yi(k) satisfies the following equation:
yi(k) = aθ + vi(k),
where a 6= 0 and vi(k) ∼ N (v¯, σ2) is i.i.d. Gaussian distributed.
V. EXTENSION
In this section, we consider two extensions to the problem settings discussed in Section IV.
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A. Secure Sensors
Consider that there is a subset of “secure” sensors that are well protected and cannot be
compromised by the attacker. We would like to study the trade-off between security and efficiency
when those “secure” sensors are deployed.
Let ms out of the total m sensors be “secure” and the remaining m−ms sensors are “normal”
ones that can be compromised by an adversary. In this subsection, n can take any value in
{0, 1, . . . , m−ms} and does not necessarily satisfy 2n < m. The other settings are the same as
in Section II. Denote by Es(f) and Ss(f) the efficiency and security of a detection rule f under
such case.
Then one obtains the following results as in Theorem 3.
Theorem 6. For any detection rule f , the following statements on Es(f) and Ss(f) are true:
1) Es(f) ≤ mC,
2) Ss(f) ≤ max((m− 2n)C,msC),
3) Ss(f) ≤ Es(f),
4) Let Es(f) = z, we have
Ss(f) ≤


h(z) if 0 < z < (m− n)Dmin
0 if z ≥ (m− n)Dmin
.
The above theorem is proved in the same manner as in Appendix B. Notice that the essential
difference is the range of Ss(f), i.e., the statement in the second bullet. This is due to the fact
that the ms secure sensors cannot be compromised.
Remark 5. From the above theorem, one sees that replacing ms normal sensors with secure
sensors does not change the fundamental trade-off between the security and efficiency. However,
the benefit of these ms secure sensors are that the security itself is improved when 2n > m−ms.
Also, one notice that when m − ms ≥ 2n, there are no gains of deploying secure sensors.
Intuitively, in such case the redundancy of the m−ms normal sensors is enough.
Furthermore, the detector f szs in Algorithm 2, which is a slight variation of f
∗
zs
and treats the
ms secure sensors separately, achieves the limits. This is stated in the following theorem, which
is proved in the same manner as in Appendix C.
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Theorem 7. If the pair (ze, zs) satisfies
0 ≤zs ≤ max((m− 2n)C,msC),
ze ≤


mC if zs = 0
he(zs) if zs > 0
,
then there holds
Es(f
s
zs
) ≥ ze, Ss(f
s
zs
) ≥ zs.
Algorithm 2 Hypothesis testing algorithm f szs when there are secure sensors
1: Compute λ¯i(k) for each sensor.
2: Compute I0(λ¯i(k)) and I1(λ¯i(k)) for each sensor. Compute the minimum sum from the
“normal” sensors:
δ(0, k) = min
|O|=m−ms−n,O⊂{1,...,m−ms}
∑
i∈O
I0(λ¯i(k)),
δ(1, k) = min
|O|=m−ms−n,O⊂{1,...,m−ms}
∑
i∈O
I1(λ¯i(k)).
3: If δ(0, k) +
∑i=m
m−ms+1
I0(λ¯i(k)) < zs, make a decision θˆ = 0; go to the next step otherwise.
4: If δ(1, k) +
∑i=m
m−ms+1
I1(λ¯i(k)) < zs, make a decision θˆ = 1; go to the next step otherwise.
5: If
∑m
i=1 λ¯i(k) < 0, make a decision θˆ = 0; make a decision θˆ = 1 otherwise.
B. Unknown Number of Compromised Sensors
In the previous section, we assume that if the system is being attacked, then n sensors are
compromised. However, in practice, the exact number of compromised sensors is likely to
be unknown. In this subsection, we assume that we know an estimated upper bound on the
compromised sensors, denoted by n. Let na denote the number of the sensors that are actually
compromised. Therefore, na may take value in Na , {0, 1, 2, . . . n}
4.
4In Section II-A, we remark that the requirement |I| = n can be equivalently replaced by |I| ≤ n. The implicit assumption
is that the estimated upper bound n is tight and the worst-case number of compromised sensors is in indeed n. Therefore, na
in this section may also be interpreted as the tight upper bound of the number of actually compromised senors.
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Given a detector f , denote by Dna(f) the detection performance when the number of com-
promised sensor is na. Then, one has D0(f) = E(f) and Dn(f) = S(f). In the following, we
present the pairwise trade-off between Dna(f) and Dn′a(f) for any 0 ≤ na, n
′
a ≤ n, and propose
an algorithm to achieve these performance limits. A similar argument as in Section IV can be
adopted to obtain these results, the details of which are omitted.
We define h˜ : Na ×Na × (0,∞) 7→ (0,∞) as
h˜(na, n
′
a, z)
,(m− n˜a)min
{
h˜0(z/(m− n˜a)), h˜1(z/(m− n˜a))
}
,
where n˜a = na + n
′
a, and
h˜0(z) =


I0(I
−1
1 (z)) if 0 < z < D(0||1)
0 if z ≥ D(0||1)
,
h˜1(z) =


I1(I
−1
0 (z)) if 0 < z < D(1||0)
0 if z ≥ D(1||0)
.
Then one obtains that for any detector f and na, n
′
a ∈ N, there hold
Dna(f) ≤ (m− 2na)C, (25)
Dna(f) ≤ h˜
(
na, n
′
a,Dn′a(f)
)
. (26)
Let z , (z0, z1, . . . , zn) be a n-tuplet of admissible detection performance, i.e.,
zna ≤ (m− 2na)C,
zna ≤ h˜(na, n
′
a, zn′a).
Then the detector in Algorithm 3, which is a variation of f ∗zs in Section IV-C and is denoted by
f ∗
z
, can achieve these performance, i.e., Dna(f
∗
z
) ≥ zna for any na ∈ N.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Asymptotic Performance
We simulate the performance of the detector f ∗zs proposed in Section IV-C (i.e., its efficiency
and security) and compare the empirical results to the theoretical ones shown in Fig. 2.
The same parameters as in Fig. 2 are used, i.e., Po0(y1(1) = 1) = 0.02, P
o
1(y1(1) = 1) = 0.6,
m = 9 and n = 2. To simulate the security, it is assumed that the following attack strategy is
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Algorithm 3 Hypothesis testing algorithm f ∗
z
initialization: na = n.
1: Compute λ¯i(k), I0(λ¯i(k)), I1(λ¯i(k)) for each sensor i.
2: While na ≥ 1
1) Compute these two minima:
δ˜(0, k, na) , min
|O|=m−na,O⊂M
∑
i∈O
I0(λ¯i(k)),
δ˜(1, k, na) , min
|O|=m−na,O⊂M
∑
i∈O
I1(λ¯i(k)).
2) If δ˜(0, k, na) < zna , make a decision θˆ = 0 and stop.
3) If δ˜(1, k, na) < zna , make a decision θˆ = 1 and stop.
4) Replace na with na − 1.
3: If
∑m
i=1 λ¯i(k) < 0, make a decision θˆ = 0; make a decision θˆ = 1 otherwise.
adopted. If θ = 0, the attacker modifies the observations of the compromised sensors such that
for every i ∈ I and k ≥ 1
I0(λ¯i(k)) ≥ zs.
On the other hand, if θ = 1, the attack strategy is such that I1(λ¯i(k)) ≥ zs holds for every i ∈ I
and k ≥ 1.
To simulate the performance with high accuracy, we adopt the importance sampling ap-
proach [23]. To plot Fig. 3, we let zs be in [0, (m− 2n)C = 1.5987]. Notice that the theoretical
performance of f ∗zs coincides exactly with the fundamental limits in Fig. 2. Therefore, Fig. 3
verifies that our algorithm f ∗zs indeed achieves the fundamental limits.
B. Non-asymptotic Performance
We have proved that our algorithm is optimal in the sense that it achieves the fundamental
trade-off between the security and efficiency. However, notice that both the security and efficiency
are asymptotic performance metrics. In this example, we show that our algorithm possesses quite
“nice” finite-time performance as well by comparing it to the naive Bayes detector. We should
remark that while the Bayes detector is strictly optimal (i.e., optimal for any time horizon) in
the absence of attackers, its security is zero. The results are in Fig. 4, where zs is chosen to
January 22, 2018 DRAFT
22
2.72 2.74 2.76 2.78 2.8 2.82 2.84 2.86 2.88 2.9
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Efficiency
S
ec
u
ri
ty
theoretical
empirical
Fig. 3: Comparison between the empirical and theoretical performance of the detector f ∗zs when
zs ∈ [0, (m− 2n)C].
be 1.4282. Fig. 4 illustrates that the algorithm f ∗zs with zs = 1.4282 has a finite-time detection
performance comparable to that of naive Bayes detector when the attacker is absent. The finite-
time performance metric ǫ(k) is defined in (7), where the attacker is absent, i.e., g = 0, and the
detector is f ∗zs=1.4282 or the naive Bayes. One should note that the security of f
∗
zs
is 1.4282. As
a result, adopting the secure detector f ∗zs increases the security of the system while introducing
minimum performance loss in the absence of the adversary.
C. Comparison with Other Detectors
To simulate the detectors introduced later, we use the same sensor network model as in
Fig. 3. The asymptotic performances, i.e., the efficiency and security, are summarized in Table I,
while the non-asymptotic performances when the attacker is absent are in Fig. 5. Table I is
consistent with the statement that our algorithm achieves the best trade-off between the security
and efficiency, while Fig. 5 shows that it is preferable to adopt our algorithm as well with respect
to the finite-time performance when the attacker is absent. In the following, we present the two
detectors to be compared to in detail.
The first detector is the equilibrium detection rule that is proposed in [14] for cases where
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k
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Naive Bayes
f ∗1.4282
Fig. 4: Finite-time performance of f ∗zs in the absence of the adversary.
m > 2n. This detection rule, which shares the same spirit with the α-trimmed mean in robust
statistics [15], first removes the largest n and smallest n log-likelihood ratios, and then compares
the mean of the remaining m − 2n log-likelihood ratios to 0, just as in the classic probability
ratio test. The details of the detection rule, denoted by ftrim, are formalized as follows.
ftrim(Y
′(k)) =


0 if
∑m−n
i=n+1 λ¯[i](k) < 0,
1 if
∑m−n
i=n+1 λ¯[i](k) ≥ 0,
where λ¯[i](k) is the i-th smallest element of {λ¯1(k), λ¯2(k), . . . , λ¯m(k)} with λ¯i(k) being the
empirical mean of log-likelihood ratio from time 1 to k for senor i, which is defined in (23).
It was shown in [14] that the security and efficiency of ftrim are
S(ftrim) = (m− 2n)C, E(ftrim) = (m− n)C.
Since for any z < C, there hold
I0(I
−1
1 (z)) > C, I1(I
−1
0 (z)) > C.
Then by the definition of h(z) and Theorem 4, one obtains that if the security of our algorithm
is (m− 2n)C, its efficiency is larger than (m− n)C, i.e.,
E(f ∗zs=(m−2n)C) > (m− n)C.
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Therefore, our algorithm is preferable since, with the same security, it achieves the larger
efficiency than the algorithm ftrim. In particular, by Theorem 5, the efficiency gain of our
algorithm in certain cases is nC.
The next detector is the q-out-of-m procedure [17], which has been studied in [8] by assuming
that the malicious sensor nodes generate fictitious data randomly and independently, and the
probability that the compromised sensor flips the binary message is known. The q-out-of-m
procedure is simple and works as follows. At time k, after receiving the mk (binary) messages,
the fusion center makes a decision
θˆ =


1 if
∑k
t=1
∑m
i=1 y
′
i(k) ≥ qk,
0 otherwise.
(27)
Let q = [q1, . . . , qk, . . .] be a sequence of thresholds used in the above detector from time 1 to
infinity. In the sequel, we denote the above detector as fqom(q). Notice that fqom(q) is just the
naive Bayesian detector, which minimizes the weighted sum of miss detection and false alarm
at each time k (the weight is determined by qk). It is clear that if fqom(q) is used at the fusion
center, the worst-case attack is always sending 0 (1) if the true state θ is 1 (0). Therefore, at
time k, the performance (i.e., the probability of detection error) of the detector fqom(q) under
the worst-case attacks is as follows.
P1(fqom(q) = 0) =
qk∑
j=0

mk − nk
j

 pj1(1− p1)mk−nk−j,
P0(fqom(q) = 1)
=
mk−nk∑
j=max(0,qk−nk)

mk − nk
j

 pj0(1− p0)mk−nk−j,
where p0 , P
o
0(y1(1) = 1) = 0.02, p1 , P
o
1(y1(1) = 1) = 0.6. Then it is reasonable to set
nk < qk < mk−nk, since otherwise the worst-case (over θ) detection error will be 1. However
it is challenging to obtain the optimal qk analytically to minimize the worst-case detection error;
we do this by brute-force numerical simulations. By varying the time k from 1 to 40, we obtain
the (approximate) security and the optimal parameters q∗1, . . . , q
∗
40. Then we further simulate the
performance of the q-out-m algorithm when the optimal parameters obtained above are used and
the attacker is absent.
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TABLE I: The asymptotic performances of our algorithm f ∗zs with zs = 1.4282, the trimmed
mean detector in [14] ftrim, and the optimal q-out-m procedure fqom(q
∗).
f∗zs=1.4282 ftrim fqom(q
∗)
security 1.43 1.43 0.69
efficiency 2.88 2.00 1.68
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
10−14
10−11
10−8
10−5
10−2
time k
ǫ(
k
)
f ∗1.4282
ftrim
fqom(q
∗)
Fig. 5: Finite-time performance of f ∗zs, ftrim, and fqom(q
∗) in the absence of the adversary.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we studied the trade-off between the detection performance of a detector when
the attacker is absent (termed efficiency) and the “worst-case” detection performance when
the attacker, knowing the detector, is present (termed security). The setting is that a binary
hypothesis testing is conducted based on measurements from a set of sensors, some of which
can be compromised by an attacker and their measurements can be manipulated arbitrarily. We
first provided the fundamental limits of the trade-off between the efficiency and security of
any detector. We then presented detectors that possesses the limits of the efficiency and security.
Therefore, a clear guideline on how to balance the efficiency and security has been established for
the system operator. An interesting point of the fundamental trade-off is that in some cases, the
maximal efficiency and the maximal security can be achieved simultaneously, i.e., the maximal
January 22, 2018 DRAFT
26
efficiency (security) can be achieved without compromising any security (efficiency). In addition,
two extensions were investigated: secure sensors are assumed for the first one, and the detection
performance beyond the efficiency and security is concerned for the second one. The main results
were verified by numerical examples. Investigating the problem when the measurements from
the benign sensors are not i.i.d. is a future direction.
APPENDIX A
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The following lemma is needed to prove Theorem 2:
Lemma 1. If Assumption 4 and 5 hold, then the following statement is true:
1) For any w,
M0(w + 1) = M1(w). (28)
2) There exists a small enough ǫ > 0, such that logM0(w) is well-defined on [−ǫ, 1+ ǫ], and
logM1(w) is well-defined on [−1− ǫ, ǫ].
3) logM0(w), logM1(w) are strictly convex.
4) The derivative of logM0(w) and logM1(w) satisfy
(logM0(w))
(1)|w=1 = D(1‖0). (29)
(logM0(w))
(1)|w=0 = −D(0‖1). (30)
(logM1(w))
(1)|w=0 = D(1‖0). (31)
(logM1(w))
(1)|w=−1 = −D(0‖1). (32)
Proof. By definition,
M0(w + 1) =
∫ ∞
−∞
(
dµ
dν
(y)
)w
dµ
dν
(y)dν(y)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(
dµ
dν
(y)
)w
dµ(y) = M1(w),
which proves (28).
Assuming M0(w1), M0(w2) <∞ and w1 < w2, by the convexity of the exponential function,
we know that for any λ and 0 < α, β < 1 and α + β = 1,
0 < exp [(αw1 + βw2)λ] ≤ αe
w1λ + βew2λ.
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Therefore 0 < M0(αw1 + βw2) ≤ αM0(w1) + βM0(w2) is well-defined, which proves that the
domain of logM0(w) is convex.
Furthermore, by Assumption 4, 0 ∈ int(dom1) gives
1 ∈ int(dom0), (33)
Hence, [0, 1] ⊂ int(dom0), which proves that logM0(w) is well-defined on [−ǫ, 1 + ǫ] if ǫ is
small enough.
It is well known that logM0(w) is infinitely differentiable on int(dom0) (see [22, Exercise
2.2.24]). Basic calculations give that
(logM0(w))
(2) (34)
=
∫
R
(
dµ
dν
(y)
)w (
log
(
dµ
dν
(y)
))2
dν(y) > 0 (35)
always holds, where (logM0(w))
(2) is the second derivative. The above quantity is strictly
positive since the KL divergence between probability measure µ and ν are strictly positive
by Assumption 5. Therefore, logM0(w) is strictly convex.
The domain and the strict convexity of logM1(w) can be proved similarly.
Take the derivative of logM0(w) at w = 1 yields
(logM0(w))
(1)|w=1 =
∫
R
λ(y)
dµ
dν
(y)dν(y)
=
∫
R
λ(y)dµ(y) = D(1‖0).
Equation (30), (31) and (32) can be proved similarly.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2:
Proof of Theorem 2. Define the derivative of logM0(w) to be ψ(w). Since logM0(w) is strictly
convex, we know that ψ(w) is strictly increasing and therefore, its inverse function is well defined
on [−D(0‖1), D(1‖0)]. Denote the inverse function as ϕ(x). By the convexity of logM0(w), we
have that
logM0(w) ≥ logM0(w∗) + ψ(w∗)(w − w∗). (36)
Hence, for any x ∈ [−D(0‖1), D(1‖0)], suppose that ψ(w∗) = x, we have
wx− logM0(w) = [w∗ψ(w∗)− logM0(w∗)]
+ [(w − w∗)ψ(w∗) + logM0(w∗)− logM0(w)] .
January 22, 2018 DRAFT
28
Notice the last term on the RHS of the equation is non-positive. Hence, we can prove that
I0(x) = w∗ψ(w∗)− logM0(w∗) = ϕ(x)x− logM0(ϕ(x)). (37)
Take the derivative and second order derivative of I0(x) we have
dI0(x)
dx
= ϕ(x),
d2I0(x)
dx2
=
1
ψ(1)(ϕ(x))
> 0,
where the last inequality is due to the fact that logM0(w) is strictly convex, and thus its second
derivative ψ(1) is strictly positive. Hence we prove that I0(x) is twice differentiable and strictly
convex on [−D(0‖1), D(1‖0)]. Notice that
dI0(x)
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=−D(0‖1)
= ϕ(−D(0‖1)) = 0,
we can prove that I0(x) is also strictly increasing. Similarly we can prove the properties for
I1(x).
Combining (37), (29) and (30), we can prove (14) and (15). Equation (16) and (17) can be
proved similarly.
Since
I0(0) = sup
w
0 · w − logM0(w) = sup
w
− logM0(w),
I1(0) = sup
w
0 · w − logM1(w) = sup
w
− logM1(w),
and
M0(w + 1) = M1(w),
We can conclude I0(0) = I1(0).
APPENDIX B
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The proof is divided into four parts, each of which is devoted to one of the statements in
Theorem 3.
Part I. For any index set O ⊂M and χ ∈ R, define the following Bayesian like detector:
fk,χ,O(Y
′(k)) =


0 if
∑
i∈O λ¯i(k) < χ,
1 if
∑
i∈O λ¯i(k) ≥ χ,
(38)
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where λ¯i(k) is the empirical mean of the log-likelihood ratio from time 1 to k for sensor i,
which is defined in (23). Denote
fχ,O = (f1,χ,O(Y
′(1)), · · · , fk,χ,O(Y
′(k)), · · · )
and
f ∗O , f0,O. (39)
It is well known that f ∗M minimize the average error probability [24]: e(θ = 0,O = ∅, k)+e(θ =
1,O = ∅, k), where, recall, e(θ,O, k) is defined in (6). Notice that
lim inf
k→∞
−
log(e(θ = 0,O = ∅, k) + e(θ = 1,O = ∅, k))
k
= lim inf
k→∞
−
logmaxθ e(θ,O = ∅, k)
k
.
Hence, when the attacker is absent, f ∗M is optimal in the sense that the rate ρ defined in (8)
is maximized. Furthermore, Crame´r’s Theorem gives that E(f ∗M) = mI0(0) = mC. Therefore,
E(f) ≤ mC holds for any detector f .
Part II. In this part, we show S(f) ≤ (m−2n)+C. The proof is by construction: we construct
a attack strategy g∗ such that, for any detection rule f , the following inequality holds:
ρ(f, g∗) ≤ (m− 2n)+C. (40)
Let O′ = {1, . . . , n} and O′′ = {m− n+ 1, . . . , m}. The attack strategy g∗ is as follows.
(i). When θ = 0, sensors in O′ are compromised and the distributions are flipped, i.e., the
measurements of sensors in O′ are i.i.d. as µ.
(ii). When θ = 1, sensors in O′′ \ O′ are compromised and the distributions are flipped.
Thus, under attack g∗, for either θ = 1 or θ = 0, sensors in O′ will follow distribution µ and
sensors in O′′ \ O′ will follow distribution ν. In other words, only sensors in M \ (O′ ∪ O′′)
have different distributions under different θ. Notice that when m ≤ 2n, M \ (O′ ∪ O′′) = ∅,
which means that ρ(f, g∗) = 0. If m > 2n, by the optimality of the detection rule f ∗M\(O′∪O′′)
defined in (39), one obtains ρ(f, g∗) ≤ (m− 2n)C. Equation (40) is thus obtained.
Part III. It is clear from the definitions of E(f) and S(f) that S(f) ≤ E(f) holds.
Part IV. Consider the following product measures:
µa = µ× µ . . .× µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−n
× ν × ν . . .× ν︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
,
µka = µa × µa . . .× µa︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
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and
ν∗ = ν × ν . . .× ν︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
,
νk∗ = ν∗ × ν∗ . . .× ν∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
.
The measure µa is generated by an attack that flips the distribution on the last n sensors, when
the true hypothesis is θ = 1. The measure ν∗ is generated by benign sensors when the true
hypothesis is θ = 0.
Now let us consider the following problem: given φ > 0, find the detection rule f such that
Eνk
∗
fk + φ
k
Eµka
(1− fk) (41)
is minimized for every k ≥ 1. Let fφ = (fφ,1, . . . , fφ,k, . . .) with fk,φ given by
fk,φ(Y
′(k)) = fk,− log φ,{1,2,...,m−n}(Y
′(k)), (42)
where, recall, the function fk,χ,O(Y
′(k)) is defined in (38). Then by the Bayesian decision-
theoretic detection theory, fφ is a solution to the above problem. Let
Eφ , lim inf
k→∞
−
logEνk
∗
fφ,k
k
and
Sφ , lim inf
k→∞
−
logEµka(1− fφ,k)
k
.
Then from the optimality of fφ, for any φ > 0 and any detector f = (f1, . . . , fk, . . .), the
following hold for any k:
If Eνk
∗
fk ≤ Eνk
∗
fφ,k, then Eµka(1− fk) ≥ Eµka(1− fφ,k).
This implies that
If lim inf
k→∞
−
logEνk
∗
fk
k
≥ Eφ,
then lim inf
k→∞
−
logEµka(1− fk)
k
≤ Sφ.
Furthermore, the definitions of E(f) and S(f) yield
E(f) ≤ lim inf
k→∞
−
logEνk
∗
fk
k
,
S(f) ≤ lim inf
k→∞
−
logEµka(1− fk)
k
.
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Therefore, for any φ > 0 and any detector f , the following hold:
If E(f) ≥ Eφ, then S(f) ≤ Sφ.
Now let us evaluate Eφ and Sφ. Let φ˜ = − log φ/(m− n), then Crame´r’s theorem yields
Eφ =


0 if φ˜ ≤ −D(0‖1),
(m− n)I0(φ˜) if φ˜ > −D(0‖1),
and
Sφ =


0 if φ˜ ≥ D(1‖0),
(m− n)I1(φ˜) if φ˜ < D(1‖0).
Notice that the monotonicity of I0(·) on [−D(0‖1),∞) implies that if 0 < Eφ < (m −
n)I0(D(1‖0)) = (m − n)D(1‖0), φ˜ ∈ (−D(0‖1), D(1‖0)) holds. Therefore, if 0 < Eφ <
(m− n)D(1‖0), there holds
Sφ = (m− n)I1(I
−1
0 (Eφ/(m− n))).
One thus obtains that for any detector f , if 0 < E(f) < (m− n)D(1‖0)
S(f) ≤ (m− n)I1(I
−1
0 (E(f)/(m− n))). (43)
Also, it is easy to see that if Eφ ≥ (m− n)D(1‖0), Sφ = 0 holds. Thus,
S(f) = 0 if E(f) ≥ (m− n)D(1‖0). (44)
Similarly, one considers the detection problem for the measures µk∗ and ν
k
a and obtains that
for any detector f , if 0 < E(f) < (m− n)D(0‖1)
S(f) ≤ (m− n)I0(I
−1
1 (E(f)/(m− n))) (45)
and
S(f) = 0 if E(f) ≥ (m− n)D(0‖1). (46)
Then equation (21a) follows from (43) and (45), and equation (21b) from (44) and (46).
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APPENDIX C
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 4
This theorem is proved by showing that f ∗zs = 0 (or 1) if certain conditions are satisfied (i.e.,
Lemma 4). Furthermore, the special structure of these conditions can ensure that, under any
attacks, f ∗zs = 0 (or 1) if the measurements of sensors in an attack free environment belong to
a certain set, to which the Crame´r’s Theorem is applied.
Before proceeding, we need to define the following subsets of Rm:
Definition 2. Define B−, B+ ⊂ Rm as
B− ,
{
λ ∈ Rm :
m∑
i=1
λi < 0
}
,B+ ,
{
λ ∈ Rm :
m∑
i=1
λi ≥ 0
}
.
Definition 3. Let O ⊂M, j ∈ {0, 1} and z ∈ R+, define a ball as
Bal(O, j, z) =
{
λ ∈ Rm :
∑
i∈O
Ij(λi) < z
}
.
Definition 4. Let j ∈ {0, 1} and z ∈ R+, define an extended ball as
EBal(j, z, n) ,
⋃
|O|=m−n
Bal(O, j, z).
From the definition of extended balls, it is clear that[
λ1 . . . λm
]
∈ EBal(j, z, n)
if and only if the following inequality holds:
min
|O|=m−n
∑
i∈O
Ij(λi) < z.
Combining with the definition of f ∗zs , we know that at time k, the output of f
∗
zs
is 0 if and
only if
λ¯(k) ,
[
λ¯1(k) · · · λ¯m(k)
]
∈ Λ−(zs),
where Λ−(zs) is defined as
Λ−(zs) , EBal(0, zs, n)
⋃(
B−\EBal(1, zs, n)
)
.
The output is 1 if λ¯(k) ∈ Λ+(zs), where
Λ+(zs) , R
m\Λ−(zs)
=
(
B+
⋃
EBal(1, zs, n)
)
\EBal(0, zs, n)
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We first need the following supporting lemma.
Lemma 2. Given O1, O2 ⊂ M , {1, 2, . . . , m} with |O1
⋂
O2| = p > 0, z ≤ pD(1‖0), the
optimal value of the following optimization problem is given by pI1(I
−1
0 (z/p)):
inf
x∈Rm
∑
i∈O1
I1(xi)
s.t.
∑
i∈O2
I0(xi) < z.
(47)
Proof. Since I1(·) is nonnegative, I1(D(1‖0)) = 0 and xi can take any value when i /∈ O2, one
can equivalently rewrite (47) as
inf
x∈Rm
∑
i∈O1∩O2
I1(xi)
s.t.
∑
i∈O2
I0(xi) < z,
xi = D(1‖0), i ∈ O1 \ O2.
By the nonnegativity of I0(·), the above equation is equivalent to
inf
x∈Rm,0<z′≤z
∑
i∈O1∩O2
I1(xi)
s.t.
∑
i∈O1∩O2
I0(xi) < z
′,
∑
i∈O2\O1
I0(xi) ≤ z − z
′,
xi = D(1‖0), i ∈ O1 \ O2.
(48)
To obtain the solution to the above equation, let us fist focus on the following optimization
problem:
min
x∈Rm
∑
i∈O
I1(xi)
s.t.
∑
i∈O
I0(xi) = z
′,
(49)
where O = O1 ∩ O2. Denotes its optimal value by ψ(z′). In the following, we show that
ψ(z′) = pI1(I
−1
0 (z
′/p)). (50)
We claim that a solution to (49) is
xi =
{
I−10 (z
′/p) if i ∈ O, (51a)
whatever if i /∈ O. (51b)
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With this claim, (50) clearly holds. In the following we show that this claim is correct.
Equation (51b) is trivial. We then focus on (51a). Due to the convexity of the functions I0(·)
and I1(·), one obtains that for any x ∈ Rm,
pI0
(∑
i∈O
xi/p
)
≤
∑
i∈O
I0(xi),
pI1
(∑
i∈O
xi/p
)
≤
∑
i∈O
I1(xi)
Therefore, without any performance loss, one may restrict the solution to the set X∗ as follows:
X
∗ , {x ∈ Rm : x1 = x2 = · · · = xp}.
Then it is clear from the monotonicity of I0 and I1 that (51a) holds. This thus proves (50).
Notice that ψ(z′) in (50) is decreasing with respect to z′. Then the fact that I0(−D(0‖1)) = 0
yields that (48) is equivalent to
min
x∈Rm
∑
i∈O1∩O2
I1(xi)
s.t.
∑
i∈O1∩O2
I0(xi) = z,
xi = −D(0‖1), i ∈ O2 \ O1,
xi = D(1‖0), i ∈ O1 \ O2,
which concludes Lemma 2 by (50).
Lemma 3. Assume that (ze, zs) are an admissible pair, then the following statements are true:
1) Bal(M, 0, ze) ⊆ B−.
2) Bal(M, 1, ze) ⊆ B
+.
3) EBal(0, zs, n)
⋂
EBal(1, zs, n) = ∅.
4) EBal(1, zs, n)
⋂
Bal(M, 0, ze) = ∅.
5) EBal(0, zs, n)
⋂
Bal(M, 1, ze) = ∅.
Proof. 1): It suffices to prove that given any x ∈ Rm, if x ∈ B+, then x 6∈ Bal(M, 0, ze). By
the convexity of I0(x), one obtains that∑
i∈M
I0(xi) ≥ mI0(1/m
∑
i∈M
xi) ≥ mI0(0) = mC,
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where the second inequality follows from x ∈ B+ and the fact that I0(x) is increasing when
x ≥ 0. Notice that by its definition, ze ≤ mC holds. The proof is done.
2): This can be proved similarly to 1).
3): By the definition of EBal, we need to prove that for any O1,O2 with |O1| = |O2| = m−n,
Bal(O1, 0, zs) ∩ Bal(O2, 1, zs) = ∅ holds. Notice that when z ≤ pD(1‖0), pI1(I
−1
0 (z/p)) is
increasing with respect to p. Thus by Lemma 2, it suffices to prove that (m−2n)I1(I
−1
0 (zs/(m−
2n))) ≥ zs, which is true because 0 ≤ zs ≤ (m−2n)C, pI1(I
−1
0 (z/p)) is decreasing with respect
to z when z ≤ pD(1‖0), and (m− 2n)I1(I
−1
0 (0)) = (m− 2n)C.
4): Similar to 3), it suffices to prove that for any O1 with |O1| = m − n, Bal(O1, 0, zs) ∩
Bal(M, 0, ze) = ∅ holds. By Lemma 2, it suffices to prove that (m−n)I1(I
−1
0 (ze/(m−n))) ≥ zs.
Then it is equivalent to prove that (m− n)I1(I
−1
0 (he(zs)/(m− n))) ≥ zs, which follows from
the definition of he(z) and the fact that pI1(I
−1
0 (z/p)) is decreasing with respect to z when
z ≤ pD(1‖0).
5): This can be proved similarly to 4).
From Lemma 3, one obtains straightforwardly the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Assume that (ze, zs) are an admissible pair, then the following set inclusions are
true:
1) EBal(0, zs, n) ⊆ Λ
−(zs).
2) EBal(1, zs, n) ⊆ Λ+(zs).
3) Bal(M, 0, ze) ⊆ Λ−(zs).
4) Bal(M, 1, ze) ⊆ Λ+(zs).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. We focus on the proof of S(f ∗zs) ≥ zs, and a similar (and simpler) approach
can be used to prove E(f ∗zs) ≥ ze. Notice that EBal(0, zs, n) ⊆ Λ
−(zs) in Lemma 4 gives that,
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under any attacks, there holds Bal(M, 0, zs) ⊆ Λ
−(zs). Therefore,
lim sup
k→∞
1
k
logP0(f
∗
zs,k
= 1)
≤ lim sup
k→∞
1
k
log Po0(λ¯(k) ∈ R
m \ Bal(M, 0, zs))
≤ − inf
x∈Rm\Bal(M,0,zs)
m∑
i=1
I0(xi)
= −zs, (52)
where the second inequality holds because of the Crame´r’s Theorem and the fact that Rm \
Bal(M, 0, zs) is closed.
Similarly, by EBal(1, zs, n) ⊆ Λ+(zs) in Lemma 4, one obtains
lim sup
k→∞
1
k
logP1(f
∗
zs,k
= 0) ≤ −zs. (53)
It follows from (52) and (53) that S(f ∗zs) ≥ zs. The proof is thus complete.
APPENDIX D
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Define the following two functions h0(z), h1(z) : (0, Dmin) 7→ (0, Dmin):
h0(z) = I0(I
−1
1 (z)),
h1(z) = I1(I
−1
0 (z)).
Then we have the following two lemmas on h0(z) and h1(z).
Lemma 5. Both h0(z) and h1(z) are convex. Furthermore, the following equality holds:
h0(C) = h1(C) = C. (54)
Proof. The equation (54) follows directly from (18) and (19). To prove the convexity of h0(z)
and h1(z), we first need to prove that I
−1
0 (x) is convex and I
−1
1 (x) is concave on [0, Dmin].
Notice that if ψ is the inverse function of φ and φ are twice differentiable, then by chain rule
ψ(2)(x) = −
φ(2)(ψ(x))
[φ(1)(ψ(x))]
3 .
Therefore, since I0(x) (I1(x)) is strictly convex and strictly decreasing (increasing) on [−D(0‖1), D(1‖0)],
I−10 (x) (I
−1
1 (x)) is convex (concave) on [0, Dmin].
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The convexity of h0(z) and h1(z) then follows the fact that the composition of a convex and
increasing (decreasing) function with a convex (concave) function is convex [25].
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5
Proof. By chain rule, we know that
dh0(z)
dz
|z=C = I
(1)
0 (x)|x=0 ×
1
I
(1)
1 (x)|x=0
= −1.
Therefore, by the convexity of h0(z), we know that
h0(z) ≥ h0(C)− (z − C)×
dh0(z)
dz
|z=C = 2C − z.
Similarly, one can prove that
h1(z) ≥ 2C − z.
Hence, by the definition of h(z),
h(z) ≥ 2(m− n)C − z,
which implies that h((m − 2n)C) ≥ mC holds and f ∗(m−2n)C achieves maximum security and
efficiency simultaneously.
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